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THE RECEPTACLE CASES IN SALES
W. BACON 'I
Smith and Company of Philadelphia engaged to buy from the Elevator
Company of Paducah one thousand bushels of wheat at a dollar a bushel,
f. o. b. cars Paducah. The wheat was to be placed in one thousand bushel
sacks which were furnished by the buyer. The Elevator Company thereafter
proceeded to carry out the contract, but after only five hundred bags had
been filled the Ohio River floods inundated the elevator, bringing about the
spoliation of the wheat in the five hundred bags. Assuming no negligence,
who bears the loss, buyer or seller? One of the many fascinating problems
in the law of sales is that which is concerned with such cases as this---cases
in which a buyer furnished his own receptades which were to be filled by
the seller with the goods the latter had undertaken to supply.
The question in such cases is this: Is the property in each portion of
the goods transferred to the buyer at the moment it is placed in one of the
buyer's receptacles, or does the property remain with the seller until he has
fulfilled his duties as to the whole of the lot which the buyer has agreed to
purchase? The problem may arise either when an identified lot of goods
was bargained for or when unascertained or future goods were the subject
of the agreement, although in most of the decided cases involving the question the subject matter of the contract appears to have been unascertained
or future goods.' It is probable that transactions are frequently concluded
by the terms of which the buyer undertakes to and does furnish the containers
for the goods, yet there is not a large number of cases in which this matter
has been dealt with. In such cases as we find there is some diversity of
opinion in the decisions announced by the courts. This is regrettable in view
of the fact that it is generally thought desirable to have uniformity in the law
of sales. 2 Furthermore, the principles applied in other types of cases involving
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I. "Future goods" are goods "to be manufactured or acquired by the seller after the making of the contract of sale." UNIFORM SALES AcT § 76. The term "unascertained goods" is

used in contradistinction to the term "specific goods". The latter term is defined in the Uniform Sales Act to mean goods "identified and agreed upon at the time a contract to sell or a
sale is made." Ibid.
The Uniform Sales Act will hereafter be cited as U. S. A. This Act was enacted in
Pennsylvania in 1915, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 69, c. I.
2. That the legislatures of the several states recognize this desire seems to be proven by
the fact that the U. S. A. has been adopted in thirty-three states; it may also be indicated by
the fact that the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the Act upon the model of
the Sale of Goods Act as enacted in England, with which country we have a very large com(733)
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the problem of the transfer of the property to the buyer do not seem to have
been applied in some of the cases in which the buyer furnished receptacles.
If the fundamental question in several types of situations is the same, consistency demands that the same principles be applied to each type, unless some
strong social policy requires exceptions.
The Governing Principle
The fundamental inquiry in every case involving the problem of whether
the seller or the buyer at any given moment owns the goods in controversy is:
Has there been a mutual assent by the parties to the bargain to a transfer
from the seller to the buyer of the ownership in an identified lot of goods?
It is true, of course, that regardless of intention, the property in any goods
cannot be transferred until some specific or ascertained lot has been segregated upon which the intention of the parties can operate.' But whether the
goods were specific at the time of the bargain, or are segregated and ear-'
marked at a later time, the property remains with the seller until both parties
assent to its transfer. 4 If the lot of goods which is the subject matter of the
bargain is identified at the time the agreement is made, the property is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties intend it to be transferred. "
If the goods are unascertained or future goods at the time of the contract,
one party, usually the seller, is charged with the duty to segregate some lot
of goods answering the terms of the contract, and he must then indicate in
some unequivocal manner that he assents to transfer the ownership in that
merce in goods. I WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) 2. See also 2 id. 1554 and U. S. A. § 74.
A bill proposing the adoption of a Federal Sales Act has been introduced in Congress. The
terms of the proposed act follow those of the U. S. A. with some modifications. H.R. 16ig,
75th Cong., Ist Sess. (1937).
3. U. S. A. § 17. "No person can be said to own a horse or a picture, unless he is able
to identify the chattel. . . !Kimberly
v. Patchin, 19 N. Y. 330, 333 (1859) ; American
Aniline Products, Inc. v. D. Nagase and Co., 187 App. Div. 555, 176 N. Y. Supp. 114 (xst
Dep't, 1919). But a property interest may be presently transferred to a share in a specific
mass of fungible goods. U. S. A. § 6 (2). The author of the Sales Act has indicated that
the doctrine of potential ownership in future goods is not recognized by the Act. I WILLISTON, SALES

256-64.

4. I WILLISTON, SALES §§ 261, 274.
"It has already been said that the specific goods must be agreed upon; that is, both parties must be pledged, the one to give and the other to accept those specific goods. This is
obviously just, for until both parties are so agreed, the appropriation cannot be binding upon'
either; not upon the one, because he has not consented, nor upon the other, because the first
is free. . . . But the difficulty arises when the original agreement does not ascertain the
specific goods, and one party has appropriated some particular goods to the agreement, but
the other party has not subsequently assented to such an appropriation. Such an appropriation is revocable by the party who made it and not binding on the other party, unless it was
made in pursuance of an authority to make the election conferred by the agreement; or unless
the act is subsequently and before its revocation adopted by the other party. In either case
it becomes final and irrevocably binding on both parties." BLACKBURN, CONTRACT OF SALE
(3d ed. 1gio) 136.
5. U. S. A. § I8. Clark v. Greeley, 62 N. H. 394 (1882) ; Groves v. Warren, 226 N. Y.
459, 123 N. E. 659 (1919).
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particular lot. 6 Even when he does so, the property will not pass unless the
7
assent of the other party can also be found or may be presumed.
The governing principle then is that the property in goods which are
the subject of a bargain and sale agreement is transferred to the buyer when
the parties intend it shall be. Unfortunately however the parties seldom
express their intention as to when the ownership is to pass because it does
not occur to them as a matter of any practical importance. They thoroughly
understand and intend that at some time or other the ownership of the goods
is to vest in the buyer but they do not usually agree upon the exact time when
the vesting is to take place. The contingencies which will make it a matter
of importance are not foreseen-such contingencies as destruction of the
goods before the buyer acquires possession, a personal property tax levy,
bankruptcy, or the appearance upon the scene of attaching creditors. The
points to which their attention is directed are payment terms, the time, place
and manner of delivery, and the standard of quality to which the goods are
to conform. If one of the above suggested contingencies arises together with
a controversy as to whether or not the risk has passed, or the attachment is
good, or the trustee in bankruptcy has the title, the court will have to analyze
the agreement in the light of the circumstances surrounding it for any manifestations of intention as to when the property was to pass. It frequently
happens, however, that neither the agreement nor the circumstances will disclose the intention." Hence it becomes necessary to speculate upon what the
parties would probably have agreed upon as the event which should bring
about the transfer of the property to the buyer, had their attention been
directed to the matter.
The Rules for Ascertaining Intention
So that these speculations may have some uniformity in application
there have been embodied in the Uniform Sales Act certain "rules for ascertaining intention", 9 which rules do lead to fair and reasonable results. Inasmuch as these rules are familiar to the profession, they would not be repeated
here were it not for the fact that the writer believes they have not been applied
6. In additioiX to the mutual assent the general rule requires a subsequent act of appropriation in the case of goods which were unascertained or future goods at the time the bargain
was made. U. S. A. § ig, Rule 4. Haynes v. Quay, 134 Mich. 229, 95 N. W. 1082 (1903);
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Peters, White & Co., 233 N. Y. 97, 134 N. E. 849 (1922). Cf.
Clarkson v. Stevens, io6 U. S. 505 (1882). But cf. Low v. Pew, io8 Mass. 347 (87);
Gile v. Lasselle, 89 Ore. 107, 171 Pac. 74r (i918).
7. U. S. A. § ig, Rule 4 (1). Neiman v. Matulef, 21o N. W. 895 (Iowa, 1926) ; Bundy
v. Meyer, 148 Minn. 252, i8I N. W. 345 (1921); Andrews v. Cheney, 62 N. H. 404 (1882);
Andrews v. Durant, ii N. Y. 35 (1854).
8. "The contract itself does not in terms say when the title should pass. Recourse must
be had, therefore, to rules of construction." City of Boscobel v. Muscoda Mfg. Co., 175 Wis.
62, 64, 183 N. W. 963, 964 (192I).
9. U. S. A. § ig. This heading would suggest that the parties actually have in mind an
intention as to when the property was to pass, but the truth probably is that these rules
embody the considered opinion of the courts as to what is fair and reasonable, the rules being
founded on the case law which preceded the formulation of the Sales Act.
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in some of the receptacle cases when they should have been. Furthermore,
the reason behind them seems sometimes to have been overlooked.
Unless a different intention appears it is the rule that if there is an
unconditional contract to sell specific goods, in a deliverable state, the property in the goods passes to the buyer when the contract is made; but if the
seller is bound to do something to the goods for the purpose of putting them
into a deliverable state, the property does not pass until such thing be done.10
If the goods are not specific at the time of the bargain, the title passes when
goods of the required description, in a deliverable state, are unconditionally
appropriated to the contract by the seller with the assent of the buyer, or by
the buyer with the assent of the seller." However, if the contract requires
the seller to deliver the goods to a carrier, or to the buyer's place of business,
or at some other place than the seller's place of business, or to pay the freight
or cost of transportation to the buyer, the property does not pass until the
goods reach the required destination,12 whether they were identified at the
13
time of the bargain or not.
The Reason of the Rules
The root from which these rules all stem is the presumption that the
buyer would not ordinarily desire to become owner of the goods until the
seller has fulfilled his duties under the contract. 1 4 It is also in accord with
natural justice that the buyer should not be compelled to assume the burdens
of ownership, such as the risk of loss, until he gets what he bargained for.Y5
And for what did he bargain? Not only for the right to become owner of a
lot of goods but also for a lot of goods in that state of completeness which
he specified they should have, i. e., for a finished job. If he also bargained
io. U. S. A. § ig, Rules I and 2.
ii. U. S. A. § ig, Rule 4 (1).
12. U. S. A. § i, Rules 4 (2) and 5. Hunter Bros. Milling Co. v. Kramer Bros., 71
Kan. 468, 8o Pac. 963 (19o5) ; Western Hat Mfg. Co. v. Berkner Bros., 172 Minn. 4, 214
N. W. 475 (1927); Vogt v. Chase Bros. Co., 235 N. Y. 2o6, 139 N. E. 242 (1923).
13. I WILLISTON, SALES § 280.
14. ". . . the reason for the rule [of § 19, Rule 2], which is that the parties do not

presumptively mean to pass title until the seller has finished his part of the performance and
the buyer has only to take the goods. The doctrine of Section IOO [§ 19], Rule 5, is indeed
only another instance of the same notion. . . ." Learned Hand, J., in Kahn v. Rosenstiel,
298 Fed. 656, 657 (S. D. N. Y. 1924).
(1922).

Accord: Zank v. Jones, 178 Wis. 573, 19o N. W. 445

I WILLISTON, SALES 531, 591.

"When the terms of sale are agreed upon, and the bargain is struck, and everything the
seller has to do with the goods is complete, the contract of sale . . . becomes absolute as
between the parties, without actual payment or delivery, and the property, and the risk of
accident to the goods, vests in the buyer." Quoted with approval in Commonwealth v. Hess,
148 Pa. 98, 105, 23 Atl. 977, 979 (1892), from Frazier v. Simmons, 139 Mass. 531, 2 N. E.
112 (1885) (Italics supplied).
15. These rules also are in accord with the general rule of contracts that a promisor is
not under a duty to perform until he receives or has tendered to him the promisee's performance for which he bargained-the so-called dependency rule established by Lord Mansfield
in Kingston v. Preston, Lofft. 194 (K. B. 1773) ; 3 WILLISTON, CONTIACrS (Rev. ed. 1936)
817 et seq.
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to have the goods delivered free on board a carrier or delivered to some place
other than the seller's place of business, then he bargained not only for the
right to become owner of a lot of goods in a deliverable state but also for
such a lot of goods delivered free on board a carrier or laid down at the particular place, i. e., again for a finished job. Until he gets what he bargained
for, it is not reasonable to presume that he assents to become owner; nor is
it just to thrust upon him the burdens of ownership. Should he desire to
obtain the benefits of ownership before the seller finished his job, he may,
of course, bargain therefor (provided the goods are specific) ; then it is also
just that he should assume the burdens.1 6 But it should clearly appear that
such is his intention before the rules set out in the preceding paragraph are
put aside.
It will be observed that the presumption is that the property is not to be
transferred to the buyer until the goods are in a deliverable state. This
presumption applies not only when the goods are ascertained at the time the
bargain is made but also when future or unascertained goods are the subject
of the bargain. The Sales Act defines goods to be in a deliverable state
"when they are in such a state that the buyer would, under the contract, be
bound to take delivery of them." 17 The buyer, unless instalment deliveries
are contemplated, is not bound to take delivery of less than the full amount
of goods that he has ordered; 1I hence, until all the goods are in that state of
completeness for which he contracted the goods are not in a deliverable state.
Furthermore packing the goods into containers, if required by the contract,
has been held to be something to be done to put them in a deliverable state, 9
and it has also been held that "completing the lading [of a ship] so that
shipping documents could be made out . .

.

[is] a thing to be done by the

vendor for the purpose of putting the goods into a deliverable state. .... ,,20
Such packing or lading is a burdensome and expensive duty cast upon the
seller by ihe terms of the contract and is done for the benefit of the buyer.
16. In the following cases the facts warrant the inference that the buyer wanted to
assume the ownership although the seller still had duties to perform: Craig Brokerage Co. v.
Joseph A. Goddard Co., 92 Ind. App. 234, 175 N. E. 19 (1931) (seller, indebted to buyer,
agreed to sell i,ooo cases of tomatoes to be applied on debt and advances; 95o cases were
labeled with buyer's labels but had not been shipped) ; Harshman v. Smith, 44 N. D. 83, 176
N. W. 3 (1919) (dealer traded ownership of a new automobile for a used car undergoing
repair, plus cash) ; Young v. Matthews, L. R. 2 C. P. 127 (1866) (buyer, a creditor, agreeing to take goods in payment of his debt. Half a loaf would be better than no bread!).
17. U. S.A. § 76 (4).
18. U. S. A. § 44 (I). "Unless otherwise agreed, the buyer of goods is not bound to
accept delivery thereof by instalments." U. S. A. § 45 (I).
19. Elgee Cotton Cases, 22 Wall. i8o (U. S. 1874) (cotton to be baled) ; Noyes v. Marlott, 156 Fed. 753 (C. C. A. 9th, 1907) (logs to be put in booms) ; Automatic Time-Table
Advertising Co. v. Automatic Time-Table Co., 2o8 Mass. 252, 94 N. E. 462 (1911) (machines
to be finished) ; Kahn v. Rosenstiel, 298 Fed. 656 (S.D. N. Y. 1924) (whiskey to be bottled
and cased and delivered f. o. b. cars) ; Rugg v. Minett, ii East. 210 (K. B. 18o9) (casks of
oil to be filled up).
20. Blackburn, J., in Anderson v. Morice, L. R. io C. P. 6o9, 618 (1875), appeal dismissed, i App. Cas. 712 (1876) (equally divided court).
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Until it is done as to all the goods, both rule and reason dictate that the buyer
should not be presumed to have assented to become owner.
Application of the Rules
If these rules be applied to the case of the Paducah seller who had filled
five hundred bags with wheat, having yet to fill the balance of five hundred
bags, it would appear that the loss falls on him and that he is still under a
contract duty to supply the buyer with one thousand bushels of wheat on condition that the buyer furnish a sufficient number of sacks. 21 The goods
would not be in a deliverable state until the whole lot of one thousand sacks
had been filled. It is true that the wheat in the five hundred sacks that were
filled would, as to each full sack, be physically in the state called for by the
contract; but the phrase "goods in a deliverable state" as it is used in three
of the rules 22 set down in the Sales Act and as it is defined in the Act 23
undoubtedly refers to all the goods contracted for.2 4 Even if the sacking
had been completed the seller would still be charged with the duty of making
delivery free on board the carrier. So not until the goods were free on board
would it be true that "everything the seller has to do with the goods is complete." 25
The presumption that the buyer would not assent to assume the ownership until the seller has fulfilled his duties under the contract must give way
if a contrary intention is evident, but the mere fact that the buyer furnished
containers for the goods does not present any ground for inferring a contrary
intention. He still wants the goods in a deliverable state and he still wants
them delivered free on board the carrier no less than if the seller were to
furnish the containers. The reasons for the rules apply with equal force
whether one party or the other furnishes receptacles.
21. Unless otherwise agreed the goods remain at the seller's risk until the property
therein is transferred to the buyer, except (I) when delivery has been made to the buyer or
to a bailee for the buyer and the title is retained by the seller as security for the price, and
(2) where delivery has been delayed through the fault of either the buyer or the seller, in
which case the goods are at the risk of the party in fault as regards any loss which might
not have occurred but for such fault. U. S. A. § 22. Andrews v. Cheney, 62 N. H. 404
(1882) (risk of loss on seller and contract duty remained subject to a condition that buyer
call). In Rugg v. Minett, ii East. 210 (K. B. 18o9), the property and risk were transferred
to buyer in lots which had been put in deliverable state, but remained with seller in lots not
yet in the deliverable state. Each lot was the subject of a separate contract. The seller
would not, however, remain under a contract duty to supply a like amount of goods for the
reason that specific goods had been contracted for. U. S. A. § 8. Dexter v. Norton, 47 N. Y.
62 (I27i).
22. U. S. A. § ig, Rules I, 2 and 4 (I).
23. U.S.A. §76 (4).
24. Gordon v. American Tankers Corp., 286 Mass. 349, 191 N. E. 51 (1934); Boiko &
Co. v. Atlantic Woolen Mills, 195 App. Div. 207, 186 N. Y. Supp. 624 (Ist Dep't, 1921),
aff'd, 234 N. Y. 583, 138 N. E. 455 (1922) ; Rugg v. Minett, ii East. 210 (K. B. 18o9). In
the Boiko case, however, the court did not have to decide the exact point as it found that all
the goods had been put in a deliverable state and that title had passed. See also VOLD, SALES
(1931) 149, 201 ; I WILLISTON, SALES §§ 265a, 277.
25. See supra note 14.

THE RECEPTACLE CASES IN SALES

The English Cases
A leading English case, however, on a state of facts analogous to that
of the Paducah transaction, reaches the conclusion that the property passes
to each container as it is filled. This case, Aldridge v. Johnson,2 6 was subsequently accepted as authoritative in Langton v. Higgins.2 7 Both have been
cited without criticism by American courts 28 and are likely, therefore, to
influence the law in this country.
The plaintiff in the Aldridge case inspected and took a sample of a mass
of barley of between 200 and 300 quarters, owned by the defendant's assignor
in bankruptcy. The next day he closed a bargain with the seller for IOO
quarters of the barley for which he paid about four-fifths of the price by
bartering and delivering to the seller thirty-two bullocks. The balance of
the price was to be paid in cash. The barley was to be put into two hundred
sacks furnished by the buyer and delivered free on board the carrier. A few
days later the seller filled three-quarters of the sacks, but being unable to
obtain space in freight cars proceeded no further with the filling. The buyer
complained on two separate occasions about the delay in delivery, on one
occasion sending an agent to the seller to demand the one hundred quarters.
Finally the seller emptied the sacks which he had filled upon the heap from
which the contents had been taken. A few days later the seller became bankrupt and the defendant was made his official assignee. The buyer, having
made demand on the assignee together with a tender of the balance of the
price, which demand and tender were refused, brought suit in conversion.
The court held that the property had not passed in the barley which had not
been sacked because there had been no appropriation of such quantity from
the mass. 29

As to the quantity which had been put in the buyer's sacks,

however, the court held that the property had passed.
The court was of the opinion either that the buyer assented to become
owner of such quantity as the seller might put in the sacks, or if this were
not true, that the buyer's demands that the barley be shipped evidenced such
assent. In this latter respect, it should be observed that it is not clear whether
the buyer knew only a part of the sacks had been filled when he made his
demands. Furthermore, the report states that the buyer sent his agent "to
26. 7 E. & B. 885 (K. B. 1857).
27. 4 H. & N. 402 (Ex. 1859).

28. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Peters, White & Co., 233 N. Y. 97, 134 N. E. 849
cases have been criticized: VOLD, SALES 201; I

(1922), infra p. 753. But the two English
WILLISTON, SALES § 573 et seq.
29. The fungible goods doctrine has not

been accepted in England. I WILLISTON, SALES
12 East. 614 (I8IO), is regarded as overruled.
Therefore the buyer did not become a tenant in common of the mass which he had inspected
and approved. Although" the fungible goods doctrine has been accepted in the United States,
it would probably not be applied in the instant case for the reason that there was no intention
manifested by the parties to become tenants in common. U. S. A. § 6 (2) ; Kimberly v.
Patchin, ig N. Y. 330 (1859). In Kimberly v. Patchin the intention was manifested by the
giving and acceptance of a bailment receipt.

§§ 148, 149. The case of Whitehouse v. Frost,
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demand of Knights the ioo quarters of barley", 30 not merely such barley as
was ready for delivery.
Certain facts present in the Aldridge case might be regarded as sufficient
to take the case out of the usual rule of presumption that the property does
not pass until the seller has fulfilled his duties under the contract on the
ground that "a different intention appears".3 1 These facts, however, were
not mentioned in the opinions. Moreover, another fact not usually present
in these receptacle cases was that the buyer had inspected the bulk from which
his portion was to be taken and had approved of its quality, but this alone
would not rebut the normal inference. In many of the cases where the buyer
has bargained for specific goods to be put into a deliverable state, he has seen
them and approved of their quality. 32 A more important fact is that the
buyer had paid about four-fifths of the price by delivering to the seller the
bullocks which he had bartered for the barley. Where the buyer has surrendered his own chattels in exchange for those the seller is to furnish, it might
well be inferred that he intended to accept ownership at the earliest possible
moment. On this ground the result of the case might be supported. 33 The
delivery of the bullocks would be the important fact, however, not the placing
of the barley in the buyer's sacks. The same inference could be drawn had
the seller furnished the sacks and labeled them with tags carrying the buyer's
34
name.
The Delivery Theory
35
Two years after the Aldridge case was decided, Langton v. Higgins
was before the English courts. Baron Bramwell proposed the theory that
when a portion of the goods is placed in a container furnished by the buyer
there is a delivery to the buyer.2 6 Acceptance of delivery by the buyer is
indeed one of the strongest indications that he assents to assume the owner3o. Aldridge v. Johnson, 7 E. & B. 885, 888 (K. B. i8o9).
31. This is the qualifying phrase set at the head of all the rules for ascertaining intention.

U. S. A. § ig.
32. The leading case is Rugg v. Minett, ii East. 2IO (18og). Several lots of casks of
turpentine were put up at auction, the casks to be completely filled up from ullage casks to
make up for leakage. It was held that title would not pass until all the casks in a lot were
filled up.
33. See cases cited supra note 16. Compare, however, Andrews v. Durant, ii N. Y. 35
(1854).
34. The labeling would indicate the seller's appropriation to the contract. Mitchell v.
Le Clair, 165 Mass. 308, 43 N. E. 117 (1896); Boiko & Co. v. Atlantic Woolen Mills, I95
App. Div. 2o7, 186 N. Y. Supp. 624 (Ist Dep't, 1921), aff'd, 234 N. Y. 583, 138 N. E. 455
(1922). Cf. Andrews v. Cheney, 62 N. H. 404 (1882) (buyer ordered goods to correspond
with sample and paid in advance).
35. 4 H. & N. 402 (Ex. 1859).
36. Id. at 409. Bramwell admitted, however, that the vendor might be bound to show
some act of delivery before he could sue for the price. The case before the court was an
action by the buyer against a third person to whom the seller had sold and delivered goods contracted for by the plaintiff, the goods having been placed in bottles furnished by the plaintiff.
It seems that all the bottles had been filled and that nothing remained to be done by the
seller but to deliver to the carrier. The court held for the first buyer.
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ship, but it is not always conclusive, as will appear.3 7 Whatever effect actual
delivery may have, it seems apparent that there is in truth no delivery to the
buyer so long as the goods remain on the seller's premises and under his
control even though the seller has placed them in the buyer's sacks, bottles or
other containers.
Delivery is defined in the Sales Act as a "voluntary transfer of possession from one person to another". 3 8 It cannot be said that when the seller
puts a shovelful of barley into the buyer's sack that so much barley has been
transferred into the possession of the buyer. Nor would there be a delivery
if a sack were completely filled, or half the sacks or all of them. The seller,
it is submitted, remains in possession until the goods are delivered to the
carrier. If Bramwell's theory be accepted, an unpaid seller would lose his
lien as soon as a portion of the goods was placed in the buyer's sack. 39 The
writer cannot believe that any court would so hold.
Another consequence of the delivery theory, if it be accepted today,
would be that section 25 of the Sales Act would be inapplicable. 40 That section provides that if a seller continues in possession of goods sold, (i. e. title
has passed), the delivery of the goods to any person receiving and paying
value for them in good faith and without notice 11of the previous sale estops
the first buyer from reclaiming them. In Langton v. Higgins the court did
give judgment to the first buyer under just these circumstances. The rule
incorporated in section 25, however, was not followed at modern common
law in England 42 although it was adopted by the Sale of Goods Act, which
is now in effect there. Assuming that the court was correct in holding that
the title had passed, 43 would it be held that the seller was no longer in possession of goods sold, on the ground that there had been a delivery to the
first buyer in the face of the inescapable fact of a delivery to the second one?
Probably not. Some difficulty, however, might arise as to the receptacles in
applying the doctrine of section 25. If the case were one in which the property in the containers passed to the seller by accession, 44 the second buyer
37. See infra p. 747.
38. U. S. A. § 76 (i).
39. A lien is lost when the buyer obtains possession of the goods.

U. S. A. § 56.

See

also § 58 (2), (3).
40. See LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SALES (193o) 564.
41. If the containers carried the first buyer's names or labels, presumably there would be
notice. Cf. Craig Brokerage Co. v. Joseph A. Goddard Co., 92 Ind. App. 234, 175 N. E. i
(1931). The bottles in Langton v. Higgins apparently were blank.
42. I WnsLLSTON, SALES § 349 et seq.
43. The conclusion might be correct, even though the delivery theory be rejected, for
two reasons: (I) The whole lot contracted for appears to have been placed in the buyer's
bottles. Hence all the goods were in a deliverable state. (2) The buyer had made large
advances on the price. Cf. mupra p. 740 and note 16.
Against (I), however, is the fact that the seller had the duty to deliver the goods to the
carrier. Against (2) is the fact that the seller gave a chattel mortgage on his stock, crops
and furniture as security for the advances.
44. See infra p. 744.
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would become owner of both the contents and the containers. If the property
in the receptacles did not pass by accession, there would then be a conversion
of the receptacles for which the second buyer would be answerable while his
title to the contents would be protected by section 25 of the Sales Act.
Security Bills of Lading Cases
An additional difficulty in applying the delivery theory advanced by
Baron Bramwell exists in those cases in which the buyer agrees to pay cash
against a bill of lading or to honor drafts against shipping documents. It is
the business understanding in such cases that the seller may reserve a security
interest in the goods by taking out a bill of lading running to his own order.
This security interest is denominated in the Sales Act as the "property in
the goods". 45 If, however, the seller has actually made a delivery to the
buyer, or to a bailee for the buyer, so that the property in the goods has
passed to him, the seller could not revest the title in himself without the
buyer's assent.4 6 Hence it would seem to follow that if the plating of the
goods in the buyer's receptacles constituted such a delivery to the buyer as to
vest title in him, any attempt by the seller to reserve the property by subsequently taking out a bill of lading running to himself would be without effect
other than to give him continued Eontrol of the goods.
Nevertheless the English Court of Appeal in Ogg v. Schuter 47 held that
the seller, by taking out a bill of lading to himself, not only reserved a right
of possession but also retained such an interest in the goods as enabled him
to convey a good title to a third person. This holding was made in a case
in which all the goods ordered had been placed in sacks furnished by the
buyer and were then delivered free on board the carrier. The intermediate
court of appeal was of the opinion that the placing of the goods in the buyer's
sacks tended very strongly to indicate that the property had passed, 48 but the
opinion of the Court of Appeal seems sound and in accord with the principle
enunciated in numerous cases at common law
section 20 of the Sales Act.

49

and now incorporated in

The above considerations seem to indicate that the delivery theory, first
propounded by Baron Bramwell, does not harmonize with either the provisions or the intent of the Sales Act, at least when containers such as sacks,
45. U. S. A.

§20 (1), (2).

46. Alderman Bros. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 92 Conn. 419, 103 Atl. 267 (1918);
Ogle v. Atkinson, 5 Taunt. 759 (C. P. 1814).
47. I C. P. D. 47 (C. A. 1875).
48. L. R. 10 C. P. 159 (1875).
49. Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Logan, 74 N. Y. 568 (1878); Pennsylvania R. R.
v. Stern, 119 Pa. 24, 12 Atl. 756 (1888); Wait v. Baker, 2 Ex. I (1848); I WILLISTON,
SALES § 283.
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bottles, cans, barrels and drums are involved. It may possibly be correct,
when the goods are received into the buyer's ship or cart. 50
The American Cases
An American case dealing with a transaction under which the buyer
furnished receptacles is O'Neill v. New York Central R. R.51 The plaintiff
ordered a quantity of cider by independent verbal contracts from two different sellers, the buyer furnishing the barrels in each instance. It is not clear
whether the sellers were obligated to deliver the goods at the buyer's city or
merely to put them free on board cars at the point of shipment. Some of both
lots of barrels were filled, transported to the railroad freight station, and
deposited there. Before the carrier had issued the shipping documents the
cider was destroyed. The court held that the property in the cider had not
passed to the buyer under either contract since the verbal contracts were void
within the Statute of Frauds. Counsel for plaintiff had argued that the
putting of the cider in plaintiff's barrels was an acceptance of the goods
sufficient to take the case out of the Statute.
An acceptance and actual receipt of the goods would have been sufficient
to take the case out of the Statute.5 2 If the theories of the Langton and the
Aldridge cases had been carried to their logical conclusion, would there not
have been an acceptance and an actual receipt of the goods? An acceptance
53
occurs if the buyer manifests an intention to become owner of the goods,
and in the latter case the court was of the opinion that by furnishing the containers the buyer assented in advance to become owner of any goods placed
in a container. Baron Bramwell, in the Langton case, had maintained that
putting the goods in the container effected a delivery to the buyer. Delivery
means that there has been a transfer of possession to the buyer; 54 hence it
would seem to follow that if there is a delivery there is a receipt of the goods.
The rejection by the court in the O'Neill case of the buyer's contention that
the putting of the cider in his barrels was sufficient to take the case out of the
Statute of Frauds indicates that the court would not accept the theory propounded in the Langton case. 5,
5o. See infra p. 748.
51. 6o N. Y. 138 (1875). This case is not noticed by the court in Procter & Gamble Co.
See LLEWELLYN, op. cit. supra
v. Peters, White & Co., 233 N. Y. 97, 134 N. E. 849 (922).
note 40, at 62o. The Procter case may be distinguishable, however. See infra p. 753. Cf.
Zank v. Jones, 178 Wis. 573, I9O N. W. 445 (1922).
52. U. S. A. § 4.
53. I WILLISTON, SALES § 75; 2 id. § 482.
See supra p. 741.
54. U. S. A. § 76 (i).
55. In Mitchell v. Weiner, 94 Conn. 446, 1o9 Atl. 164 (I92O), the buyer furnished sacks
in which the seller was to place all the #I potatoes of a mixed lot which the buyer had inspected. Some of the #I grade were delivered and paid for by the buyer. He refused to
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Accession
There is one factor which perhaps persuades some students and judges
to adopt the view that the property in goods placed in the buyer's containers
should be deemed to pass eo instanti when any receptacle is filled; namely,
that in some cases the receptacle becomes incorporated with the contents so
that it has no further value as a chattel apart from the contents which it
encloses. This would be the case when tin cans are furnished to be filled with
tomato soup, or cellophane is supplied in which to wrap cigars, or paper bags
are sent to the seller which he is to fill with flour. A can having been filled
and sealed, the cigar having been wrapped, or the paper bag having been
filled with flour, the container or wrapper, for all commercial purposes, cannot be emptied and used again. The container and its contents have been
united into one commercial article. This led to Baron Bramwell's observation that ". . . it would be monstrous if the vendor could say, 'I have
destroyed your vessel by putting into it the article you purchased, but still the
property in the article never passed to you' ".-1
This "monstrous" thing was said, however, by a respectable American
court in Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Schriver.57 The buyer had furnished
paper bags which the seller was to fill with flour. The seller filled them and
made shipment under bills of lading drawn to his own order, which he forwarded to the buyer together with a draft for the price. The buyer dishonored the draft and the seller directed the carrier to deliver the goods elsewhere.
The buyer then sought to replevy the goods. In the course of the opinion
the court said:
"The bags were voluntarily turned over to the plaintiff to be filled
with flour. In a certain sense the process of manufacturing flour for
market is not entirely complete until the flour is cased in sacks. At least
the product is not merchantable until that or its equivalent is done, since
the commodity cannot be handled in bulk. When once a bag has been
filled with flour, the two cannot be separated without loss, and it is not
contemplated that they shall be separated except as the flour is finally
consumed. For all practical commercial and legal purposes the bag and
its contents become inseverable. They are no longer independently
identified as so many pounds of flour and a bag, but they become united
in a single entity, a sack of flour. The flour, however, is the principal
thing. The sack is but a minor accessory to the flour, and, in comparison
accept the rest which the seller tendered. The seller brought an action for the balance of the
price and prevailed in the lower court under instructions given to the jury that title passed
to the #i potatoes when the contract was made. On appeal this was held to be an erroneous
instruction on the ground that the subject matter of the bargain was not specific when the
contract was made. The court was not called upon to determine whether or not title passed
when the #i potatoes were sorted out and placed in the buyer's bags. The seller had the
duty to transport the goods to the buyer. Under the rules and principles stated above it is
submitted that title would not pass until delivery was made and accepted.
56. Langton v. Higgins, 4 H. & N. 402, 409 (Ex. 1859).
57. 72 Kan. 550, 84 Pac. 1i1 (i9o6).
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with it, is of an almost negligible value. Therefore, under ordinary
circumstances and in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, a party supplying sacks will be held to consent that his subsidiary
and relatively unimportantcontributionto the final product shall become
an accession to the contribution of the manufacturer. If by accident,
inadvertence, mistake or other conduct not involving fraud, a sack be
improperly filled, the result is the same as if it were lost or destroyed.
The remedy is not by replevin, but through an action for damages, since
the law, as a means of justice, will not jeopardize the overwhelming
mass and value of the article for that which is insignificant and incidental." 08
The reasoning is sound and in accord with analogous cases in which a
seller undertakes to supply a buyer with goods in which a minor accessory to be
furnished by the latter is to be incorporated.5 9 If the seller is to manufacture
for a buyer a machine in which certain fittings supplied by the buyer are to be
incorporated, it would startle no one to be told that there is an accession of
the fittings to the machine which would become the property of the seller at
least until it is finished. If the seller is to manufacture a dozen machines
for the buyer to be delivered in one lot, the case is no different. If he is to
manufacture a hundred chairs and varnish them with the buyer's varnish,
there is no reason for making a distinction and holding that title passes to
each chair as it is encased in the buyer's varnish; or if the seller is to fill less
valuable Connecticut tobacco leaf with more valuable Hanava filler; or if tin
cans are to be filled with tomato soup or candies wrapped in cellophane. In
all these cases the buyer contracts for a finished lot of goods, whether the lot
is made up of one unit or many units.
Accession Is Unimportant
Should it make any difference that the receptacles are used merely as
conveniences for storing and transporting the goods and so can be emptied
and used again? Potato and grain sacks, barrels and oil drums are of such
a character. In the O'Neill case, where cider barrels were involved, 60 the
court did not discuss whether or not the buyer had an action against the
railroad for the loss of the barrels; nor did the court in the Ogg case 61 deal
with the position of the buyer's potato sacks. It seems clear, however, that
there was no accession of those articles to the contents. 62 The seller's rela8. Id. at 553, 84 Pac. at 120 (Italics supplied).
59. See BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY (1936) § 25, citing Arnott v. Kansas Pac. Ry., 19
Kan. 95 (1877); Eaton v. Munroe, 52 Me. 63 (i862) ; Merritt v. Johnson, 7 Johns. 473
(N. Y. I81) ; Gregory v. Stryker, 2 Denio 628 (N. Y. 1846) ; Mack v. Snell, 14o N. Y. 193,
35 N. E. 493 (1893).
6o. Supra p. 743.
61. Supra p. 742.
62. "An article which can be detached without [injury to the principal part] is, however,
probably not an accession within the principles of the doctrine." BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 49, citing Hallman v. Dothan Foundry & Mach. Co., I7 Ala. App. 152, 82 So. 642 (1919)
(truck attachment for Ford) ; Clark v. Wells, 45 Vt. 4 (1872) (wheels and axles on wagon).
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tion to containers of such a nature is apparently that of bailee or perhaps only
that of a bare custodian. Under either view it would seem that if they were
not returned to the buyer (as they were not in Ogg v. Schuter), he would
have an action in damages against the seller for their value, unless the reason
for non-return was destruction by fire or other casualty without fault of the
seller (as in the O'Neill case). The same would be true of containers which
became the property of the seller by accession as is indicated in the excerpt
63
from the opinion in the Kansas case involving the flour bags.
That the containers become an integral part of the finished product,
however, is not of any real significance in determining whether or not the title
passes piecemeal as each receptacle is filled. In any event the buyer contracts
for a single lot of goods which are to be put into a deliverable state. This,
as we have seen, requires that the whole lot be in that state. 64 Even if all
the receptacles have been filled but the seller is still under a duty to deliver the
goods to a carrier, or to the buyer's city f. o. b., or to the buyer's factory or
store, the normal presumption that the property is not to pass until such duty
be fulfilled should apply. 65
A proper conclusion, therefore, would seem to be that the fact that the
buyer furnishes the receptacles is a neutral circumstance and not one upon
which the true solution of the question whether title has passed depends.
The question must really be answered by an analysis of other facts and circumstances which may indicate the intention of the parties upon the point.
In the absence of any other significant facts and circumstances, therefore, the
general principle that the buyer presumably does not intend to become owner
until the seller has fulfilled all his duties under the contract should be applied
in these receptacle cases as in other types of cases. 66
63. Supra p. 744.
64. Supra p. 737.
In the Ogg case, the seller had filled all the containers and had shipped the goods, thus
fulfilling all the terms of the bargain, and the reason why title did not pass was that he had
reserved the title as security for the purchase-money. U. S. A. § 2o (I), (2). In the Kansas
case he had also fully performed and had sent the bill of lading to the buyer with a draft for
the price. Since the buyer had dishonored the draft, U. S. A. § 20 (4) would apply in protection of the seller.
It may be contended that these two cases are not strictly in point as authority for the
contention that the buyer does not presumably intend to become owner by piecemeal as each
receptacle is filled. It is true that the cases do not decide that point directly, but the cases
are authority for the position that the filling of the receptacles is not a delivery to the buyer.
65. See supra note 14.
66. One wonders if the courts which might be disposed to follow the theory of the
Aldridge case, would extend the theory to cases where labels are furnished by the buyer and
hold that title would pass to each can of tomato soup, for example, as the buyer's labels were
pasted on it. It could scarcely be contended, however, that such an act would constitute a
delivery to the buyer even under the broad view expressed in the Langton case.
The writer has been able to discover only two cases in which labels furnished by the
buyer are mentioned. One is Craig Brokerage Co. v. Joseph A. Goddard Co., 92 Ind. App.
234, 175 N. E. 39 (i93). In that case the buyer furnished his labels to be put on IOOO cases
of cans of tomatoes. A debt of $iooo owed by the seller to the buyer was to be cancelled by
this sale and the buyer made further advances to aid the seller in fulfilling the contract. 95o
cases had been prepared and labeled and set apart from other stock in the seller's plant and
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The Effect of Delivery
A qualification of the foregoing statemnent must be made to cover those
cases in which there is an actual delivery into the possession of the buyer of
a portion of the goods less than the whole amount ordered. If instalment
deliveries are contemplated by the bargain then, of course, when the seller
has fulfilled his duties as to an instalment by making delivery to a carrier, or
to the buyer's city if that is called for, it is natural to infer that the buyer
assents to become owner. The buyer in such instances has authorized the
seller to make deliveries in such a manner. Contracts of the above type are
usually severable in that there are to be two or more performances rendered
by the one party in return for which an equal number of performances are to
be rendered by the other. In the typical instalment contract for deliveries
at intervals of a week or a month, each instalment is to be paid for on delivery.
Even if an entire, rather than a severable, contract is arranged, there
may be a delivery and acceptance of a portion so as to bring about a transfer
of the property in that portion although payment may not be due until the
whole quantity ordered is finally delivered. If a quantity of goods are
ordered which will make up several carloads to be shipped successively as
ready, it may be inferred that as soon as the seller fulfills his duties as to each
carload the property in that lot is intended to pass. 67 Although such transactions are, perhaps, not strictly instalment contracts, the parties probably
contemplate that delivery is to be made successively at brief intervals rather
than by one continuous delivery on a single occasion. Especially will this be
true if the contract calls for delivery "free on board" at the point of shipment. The seller by loading the car and taking out proper shipping documents has, in legal effect, made delivery to the buyer in a manner previously
authorized by him.0 8
the seller had notified the buyer by phone that the tomatoes were ready to be shipped. Subsequently the seller diverted the cans to another buyer. The court held that title had passed
to the first buyer. The facts warrant the conclusion, in view of the debt, advances and phone
conversation, that the buyer assented to become owner of the segregated lot of goods. It
would probably have made no difference if the seller had caused the labels to be printed and
attached. Compare cases cited supra note i6.
The other case is Frank Pure Food Co. v. Dodson, 281 Pa. 125, 126 Atl. 243 (1934).
The buyer had furnished labels to be put on cans of sauerkraut, 2000 cases being ordered,
wooo of which were delivered and paid for. Before the balance had been appropriated or the
labels attached, the buyer repudiated. It was held that the seller could not recover the price
for the balance but only damages for breach of contract, since title had not passed before
the repudiation.
67. Lynn M. Ranger, Inc. v. Gildersleeve, io6 Conn. 372, 138 Atl. 142 (1927) ; Shapiro
v. Goodman, 236 Mich. 412, 21o N. W. 211 (1926). It is assumed in the text that separate
drafts for the price of each carload are not arranged for but a single draft is to be presented
for the whole amount of goods shipped. Thus an entire and not a severable contract is
involved.
68. U. S. A. § 46 (i).
Such a delivery "puts them into a possession adverse to the
seller". Smith v. Edwards, 156 Mass. 221, 223, 3o N. E. IOI7, ioi8 (I892). This would
not be true if the seller took out a bill of lading to his own order; but, if except for the
form of the bill, title would have passed, then the risk of loss would be on the buyer, the
seller's title being solely for security. U. S. A. §§ 20 (I), 22 (a).
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The terms of an entire contract may require a delivery to the buyer
rather than to a carrier. In such a case it has been held that delivery to and
receipt of a part by the buyer brought about a transfer of the property in that
part. 69 If the buyer willingly takes into his possession at his warehouse or
factory a portion of the goods tendered by the seller, to whichi nothing further remains to be done, knowing that no further delivery is to be made on
the same occasion, it is a fair inference that he assents to assume ownership
in them. Whether or not the delivery is made in the buyer's containers is,
of course, immaterial. They are in a place where he can immediately consume them, use them in the process of manufacture, or exhibit them for sale
70
to others.
Although acceptance of actual possession by the buyer is a strong circumstance indicating his assent to become owner, it is not always decisive.
Where delivery is made and received by the buyer "only as a step in the performance of the contract and for the purpose of better enabling the seller to
perform his remaining obligations, the delivery is conditional only and does
not control the passing of title. And this is particularly true where the thing
delivered is not capable of being used by the buyer without a more complete
fulfillment of the seller's obligations." 71 In such a case the usual presumption that the buyer does not assent to become owner until the seller has
fulfilled his duties would naturally be applicable.
The Ship Cases
When delivery is being made of one lot of goods into a ship for transportation to the buyer and he must pay the charges, the question arises
whether the delivery of each portion as it goes over the side warrants the
conclusion that the buyer assents to assume ownership piecemeal or whether
he is receiving delivery "only as a step in the performance of the contract and
69. Williamson v. Richardson, 205 Fed. 245 (C. C. A. 9th, 1913) ; Thompson and Petty
v. Conover, 32 N. J. L. 466 (Sup. Ct. 1865). See also I WILISTON, SALES § 533.
70. VOLD, SALES 200.

71. Lumry v. Kryzmarzick, 48 N. D. 234, 240, 184 N. W. 254, 256 (1921) (second-hand
tractor to be put in proper working condition by seller). Accord: :noxville Tinware &
Mfg. Co. v. Rogers, 158 Tenn. 126, 1I S. W. (2d) 874 (1928) (furnace to be installed);
Sliter v. Creek View Cheese Factory, 172 Wis. 639, 179 N. W. 745 (1920) (machine to be
set up and put in running order).
It may also appear that the seller does not mean to relinquish his ownership until payment is forthcoming even though he has made delivery on the buyer's premises. These are
the so-called "cash sale" cases. South San Francisco Packing & Provision Co. v. Jacobsen,
183 Cal. 131, 19o Pac. 628 (1920) ; Stone v. Perry, 6o Me. 48 (1872) ; Levin v. Smith, I
Denio 571 (N. Y. 1845). The seller must not sleep upon his rights, however, or he will be
deemed to have waived the condition that title is not to pass until payment is made. Frech
v. Lewis, 218 Pa. 141, 67 AtI. 45 (1907).
Compare with the above cases Bramwell's remark in Langton v. Higgins: "Or suppose
a vendor was to deliver a ton of coals into the vendee's cellar, could he say, 'I have put the
coals in your cellar but I have a right to take them away again' ?" 4 H. & N. 405, 410
(1859). Apparently he could if a cash sale were intended. Iammett v. Linneman, 48 N. Y.
399 (1872).

THE RECEPTACLE CASES IN SALES

for the purpose of better enabling the seller to perform his remaining obligation" to load the remainder of the goods.
In Anderson v. Morice,72 the seller was engaged in loading a cargo of
wheat which he had contracted to sell to the plaintiff when the ship foundered
and was lost before the loading was completed. The ship had been chartered
by the seller, but the "freight was specifically included in the price to be paid
by the purchaser. He was in the end to pay the estimated cost of the hire of
the ship".73 Even though that was true, it could not be said that the ship
was the buyer's ship; hence, the delivery from time to time as the wheat went
over the side was not a delivery into the actual possession of the buyer. The
shipowner under a charter party is an independent contractor and has the
possession of a bailee, not the mere custody of a servant or ordinary agent.
Furthermore, the buyer was to honor drafts against the shipping documents.
This provision in the contract would authorize the seller to reserve a security
title by taking out the documents to his own order or he could reserve an
effective control over the goods even though he took out an order bill consigning the cargo to the buyer. But if, except for the form of the bill of
lading title would have passed to the buyer the risk of loss will be in him, at
least after the lading is complete and the bills are issued.7 4
It was held in the Anderson case that the risk of loss in the partly laden
cargo still remained with the seller. Justice Blackburn, in the Exchequer
Chamber, said:
"Now, the completing the lading so that shipping documents could
be made out seems to us a thing to be done by the vendor for the purpose
of putting the goods into a deliverable state, or, to substitute the language of Sir C. Creswell, an act to be done by the seller for the benefit
of the buyer. .

.

. We do proceed on the ground that the prima facie

rule of construction is that the parties intended that the risk should
become that of the buyer, Anderson, when, and not till, the whole lading
was complete, so as to enable the shippers, by getting the shipping documents, to call on the buyer to accept and pay for the cargo. .

.

. We

do not think that the fact that the vessel was designated, and that, unless
under exceptional circumstances, the seller could not, without the consent
72. L. R. io C. P. 6o9 (1875). This is the citation of the opinions delivered in the
Exchequer Chamber. On appeil to the House of Lords the court was evenly divided resulting in an affirmance of the Exchequer Chamber. i App. Cas. 712 (1876).
Lord Hatherley, for affirmance, said: "I apprehend that what was to be at [the risk of
the buyer] was what he had purchased. It appears to me that he was to be at the risk of the
cargo which was to be sent to him by the Sunbeam, and that the property would not pass
until that thing was brought into existence which he had bought. Now the thing he had
bought was . . . a whole and complete cargo of rice to be shipped by the Sunbeam." Id.
at 73o.

The Lords who were for reversal of the Court of Exchequer relied much upon the
Aldridge and the Langton cases.
73. This fact appears in the report from the Court of Common Pleas, L. R. Io C. P. 58,

72 (1875).

74. U. S. A.

§2o (I),

(2),

(3); §22 (a) ; Dows v. National Exchange Bank, 91 U. S.

618 (1875) ; Wait v. Baker, 2 Ex. I (1848).
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of the shipowner, take any goods once on board out of her, affects the
question as between the vendor and purchaser." 75
Would it have made any difference if tlhe ship had been chartered by the
buyer? The ship captain would still be an independent contractor and the
delivery into the ship would be into his possession rather than into the possession of the buyer. Furthermore the seller would still be able to reserve
the possession by taking out order bills of lading and could even reserve the
title. 76 The language quoted in the preceding paragraph would still seem to
be applicable. But the English court in Colonial Insurance Co. v. Adelaide
Insurance Co. 77 held that the title and risk passed to the buyer from time to
time as the goods went over the side. The Anderson case was distinguished
on the ground that in the case at bar the delivery into the buyer's chartered
ship was a delivery to him. It may be conceded, however, that a delivery to
a bailee for the buyer should have the same effect as a delivery to the buyer
himself. But, as has been said above, delivery to the buyer, although a strong
circumstance tending to show that he accepts ownership of so much as is
delivered, is not conclusive. Another distinction between the two cases was
made in the later one and is explained by Benjamin in his work on Sales.
A distinction must be noticed, the learned author writes, between "a
quantity of goods .

.

.

contracted for as an undivided whole, as, for

instance, a cargo", and a contract for "a certain quantity of goods". In the
former case, "the property in the goods constituting the cargo will ordinarily
not pass until the whole cargo is made up and appropriated on completion".
In the latter case, "the property in the portion from time to time dispatched
or loaded will prima facie pass to the buyer." 78 This indeed seems to be a
distinction without a difference insofar as the principle is concerned; one of
the sort that would delight the inmates of Von Jhering's perfect heaven for
lawyers and judges where there is a machine which will split a hair into
999,999 parts and when operated by the most expert jurists can split again
79
each part into 999,999 other parts.
Is there any difference in principle between a case where the contract
calls for a "cargo of wheat to contain approximately 25,000 bushels to be
shipped on the Sunbeam" so and one where it calls for "25,000 bushels of
wheat to be shipped on the Duke of Sutherland"?8' Can it be said that in
the one case a single performance and a single delivery by the buyer is contracted for but that in the other a consecutive series of performances is bar75. L. R. io C. P. 609, 618-6ig (1875).
76. Turner v. Trustees, 6 Ex. 543 (1851); see I WILLISTON, SALES §§ 282, 283, 285.
77. 12 App. Cas. 128 (1886).
78. BENJAIN, SALES (7th ed. 1931) 380-381.
79. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach (1935) 35 CoL. L.
REV. 80g. See infra p. 754 and note 91.

80. Anderson v. Morice, L. R. io C. P. 6og (1875).
81. Colonial Ins. Co. v. Adelaide Ins. Co., 12 App. Cas. 128 (1886).
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gained for? The truth is that the buyer has contracted to receive a whole
thing, a complete cargo, regardless of whether he or the seller chartered the
ship in which the cargo is to be carried. There is some merit, however, in
the distinction that when the ship is chartered by the buyer a delivery into
the ship is a delivery to him,82 but the case is even then readily distinguishable
from those in which the buyer has taken delivery of an instalment on his own
premises, knowing that no further delivery is to be made on the same occasion. By not raising any objection to this partial delivery the buyer appears
to be satisfied to accept it. On the other hand, while the ship is being loaded
the goods are not in a place where the buyer can immediately use them. The
delivery is received into the ship, as it must be, "only as a step in the performance of the contract and for the purpose of better enabling the seller to
perform his remaining obligation" to load the balance of the cargo immediately.
The Pennsylvania Cases
If the vessel which is sent to receive the goods is owned by the buyer,
rather than having been chartered by him, a stronger case would be made out
in favor of the delivery theory. The vessel would not then be in the possession of an independent contractor but, at least while his own agents were in
control, would be in the possession of the buyer. Yet even in such circumstances, the state and federal courts in Pennsylvania have held that the property in the goods does not pass to the buyer until the vessel is filled. These
cases are consistent with the general principle that, until the seller has fulfilled
his duties, the natural as well as the legal presumption is that the buyer's
assent to assume the ownership is withheld.
The leading Pennsylvania case is Rochester & Oleopolis Oil Co. v.
Hughey.83 The contract called for four barge loads of oil, about 2200 bar82. Professor Williston apparently accepts this distinction. He questions the soundness
of the theory of the Aldridge case to the effect that there is a manifestation of assent by the

buyer to take title as each receptacle is filled and the theory of the Langton case that placing
goods in the container is a delivery to the buyer. But he approves of the Colonial Insurance
Co. case on the ground that there was a delivery to the buyer. i WnrLisToN, SALES § 277.
With reference to Pennsylvania cases, discussed infra, Professor Williston says:
"If the question were merely one of appropriation, these cases would be sound, but it seems
impossible to distinguish them, on the question of delivery, from the case of Colonial Ins. Co.
v. Adelaide Ins. Co. . . . and the English decision seems correct." Id. at 579, n. 72.
The writer agrees that it is impossible to distinguish the Pennsylvania cases, on the
question of delivery, from the English cases, but believes that the point of delivery is not
conclusive.
Professor Vold appears to question the Aldridge case but approves the Colonial Insurance
Co. case and the result in Langton v. Higgihs. He apparently questions the Pennsylvania
cases. VOLD, SALES 200-202.
83. 56 Pa. 322 (1867). This case was followed by Hays v. Pittsburgh, G. & B. Packet
Co., 33 Fed. 552 (W. D. Pa. 1888). With the Pennsylvania cases, compare Zank v. Jones.
178 Wis. 573, I9O N. W. 445 (1922). The buyer had ordered a quantity of potatoes. His
employees were sent to assist the seller in sacking the potatoes, which they did. After the
potatoes were sacked they were set aside awaiting transportation to the railroad for shipment
to the buyer. They were damaged by frost. The court held that title had not passed as the
seller still had the duty to transport to the railroad station. The sacks were not, apparently,
the buyer's.
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rels to be delivered from the pipe lines of a bailee of the seller into boats
furnished by the buyer. Two boats were tied up alongside the bailee's wharf
and were partly filled when a fire destroyed them and their contents. An
agent of the buyer testified that each of the boats was to be filled up with
more oil before he expected to remove them. The trial court rejected evidence
offered by the seller which would tend to prove that the agent of the buyer
had possession and control of the boats while they were being loaded, apparently on the ground that such evidence was immaterial. The appellate court
affirmed a decision in favor of the buyer, who was being sued for the price,
saying: "The defendant could not be compelled to take a partly filled barge
when he had contracted for full ones, any more than if he had contracted for
a barrel of oil could he have been compelled to accept one half or quarter full.
This would hardly be contended for, yet the principle is the same". 84
Of course the buyer can always reject an insufficient delivery tendered
by the seller whether the title has passed to the part delivered or not. 5 If
title has passed, the buyer may revest it in the seller; if it has not, he may
refuse to accept it. Hence, it may be said that the above quoted language,
which constitutes the gist of the opinion, may be somewhat beside the point.
But the holding that neither the property nor the risk of loss had passed to
the buyer is in accord with the reasoning in the Anderson case and the general
rules and principles set forth at the commencement of this paper.
The question comes to mind as to what ruling the court would have
made had one of the barges been completely filled and moved away from the
dock and then destroyed before the lading of the other barge had been completed. On this point the trial court charged that if one of the boats was
loaded so that the buyer was bound to accept, or the boat was actually taken
into his charge so as to waive the right to have more oil put into it, the risk
would have passed to the buyer. The appellate court found it unnecessary
to pass upon the correctness of that charge as the facts found by the jury
were otherwise. The charge, however, was probably correct. It is true that
under such an hypothesis the seller still would have duties to perform under
the contract, but the analogy to the instalment delivery cases is strong. Four
acts of performance, it may be said, were bargained for; namely, the supplying of four full barges. That a single delivery upon one occasion was not
contemplated seems to be indicated by the fact that the buyer had only two
barges at the dock on the occasion when the fire took place, although ultimately four barge loads were to be supplied. Assuming that a barge had
been filled and was under the control of his agent, it would be in that state
for which the buyer had contracted; it would also be delivered and in the
buyer's possession, and he could do as he willed with it.
84 56 Pa. 322, 325 (1867).
85. U. S. A. § 44. This point bothered the English court a little in Langton v. Higgins.
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The Tank Car Case
A case somewhat like the variation of the Pennsylvania case just
suggested is Procter & Gamble Co. v. Peters, White & Co.8 6 although
in other respects it is essentially different. The contract here was for the
purchase of all the menhaden oil to be manufactured during a period of
eleven months except that an option was reserved to the seller's factor to take
6,ooo barrels. The oil was to be received in the buyer's tank cars or in barrels
to be furnished by the buyer. It is to be noticed that the oil was to be
"invoiced as produced" and that the seller was privileged to draw on the
buyer for the purchase price of oil placed in tank cars or barrels. Furthermore, if not enough cars or barrels were supplied to receive the oil as it was
ready for shipment, the seller could either store the excess or, if more than
15,OOO barrels accumulated, he could ship the excess in other than the buyer's
tank cars. The buyer, who was to pay the freight charges in all instances,
made an advance payment of $25,000. Settlements were to be made at the
7
end of each month on the invoices as corrected by weighmaster's returns .
The whole arrangement is replete with evidence of an intention that the
buyer expected to take delivery in piecemeal lots from time to time. As soon
as a tank car was filled it would be ready to send off. It would then be turned
over to the carrier who would have possession as bailee for the buyer, and
the seller could and presumably would at once invoice it to the buyer. In the
other cases previously discussed, except possibly the Pennsylvania oil barge
case, a single performance by the seller was bargained for; and we have
urged that until he has fully performed, it should be presumed that the buyer
would not assent to accept the ownership. But when, as in the instant case,
a series of performances are bargained for, it is reasonable to infer that the
buyer would assent to become owner from time to time as a complete unit of
performance is tendered.
The New York court held that, as to two of the buyer's tank cars which
had been completely filled and diverted to a third person, a conversion of the
buyer's goods had taken place for which he was entitled to damages. The
opinion was not placed upon the foregoing reasons, however, but upon the
ground merely that "there was an actual delivery of the oil to the plaintiff",
citing the Langtoin case. Whether or not the court meant that there had been
a delivery from time to time as the oil passed into the car or only when the
car was completely filled and thus in a deliverable state is not clear. If the
former is meant, then on its ratio decidendi, the case is contrary to the Pennsylvania decisions and unsound on principle; if the latter is meant, the case
is distinguishable from the Pennsylvania cases, in which, it will be remem86.

233 N. Y. 97, 134 N. E. 849 (1922).
87. Not all the above facts appear in the report. Those which do not are taken from the
record on the appeal. None of the briefs cited any of the cases which have been discussed at
length in this article.
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bered, the barges were not filled to the point which the buyer had a right to
8
demand. On its facts, however, the result reached in the case seems sound.1
"The FunctionalApproach"
An attempt has been made in the foregoing discussion to evaluate the
"receptacle cases" on the basis of the rules and principles which are applied
in all classes of cases turning upon the question whether or not at a given
moment the buyer or the seller is the owner of certain goods. The answer
depends upon the intention of the parties, but in most of the cases the parties
have not expressed their thought (assuming they had any) upon the point.
The general rules are to be applied unless a different intention appears. Since
intentions can be implied from various facts, there may be a tendency on the
part of the courts to look to the fairness of one result as against another
rather than to apply general rules with consistency or to abide strictly by
principle. Professor Llewellyn, with his devotion to "narrow issue thinking"
as against "lump concept thinking" 89 boldly inquires:
"Does it not challenge to thought that the cases where 'title' is ruled
'to have passed' are cases where B is claiming rights, and the bulk of
cases where 'title' is ruled 'not to have passed' under imperfect compliance by S are cases where B is claiming to avoid obligation?" 90
For whatever it may be worth, we note that in the following cases where
the buyer was claiming rights, it was held that title had passed: Aldridge v.
Johnson (buyer who had paid in advance versus seller's assignee in bankruptcy) ; Langton v. Higgins (buyer who had made advances versus second
buyer from seller); 91 Procter & Gamble v. Peters, White & Co. (buyer
versus seller's factor who knew the facts). In Colonial Insurance Co. case,
88. The correctness of the case has been criticized on another ground, viz., that the seller
took out bills of lading on the cars, consigning them to his factor, who in turn endorsed the
bills to a third person. It is argued from this fact that the case is inconsistent with those
cases holding that the seller, even though he makes delivery into the buyer's own ship, may
reserve the title. (1922) 7 CORN. L. Q. 399. It is true that an unpaid seller may do this in
order to secure the purchase money. See supra p. 742. It should be observed, however, that

settlements were to be made monthly, although it seems that the seller was also entitled to
draw drafts from time to time for the oil that was ready. On this point, which is indeed
somewhat troublesome, and which is not discussed by the court at all, the case should be
compared on the one hand with Ogg v. Schuter, I C. P. D. 47 (C. A. 1875), and on the other
with Ogle v. Atchinson, 5 Taunt. 759 (C. P. 1814), and Lovell v. Newman & Son, 192 Fed.
753 (C. C. A. 5th, 1912). In view of the arrangement for monthly settlements in the Procter&
Gamble case, it is possible that it was not understood between the parties that the seller could
secure himself by retaining control over the goods, but that he relied on the buyer's credit.
If that be so, the form of the bill of lading would not indicate that the seller meant to reserve
the title. It seems probable that the seller intended to make an unconditional appropriation
to the buyer when he filled the cars. The court does not have to decide the rights of the
endorsee of the bill of lading. If the action had been against him a nice point would have
arisen. Cf. Hubbard Bros. & Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 256 Fed. 761 (C. C. A. 5th, 1919).
89. LLEWELLYN, op. cit. supra note 40, at 561, 564 et seq. The inquiry is not limited to
the receptacle cases.
90. Id. at 617.

91. So far as appears the second buyer was without notice, but the goods were in the
first buyer's bottles.
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where the action was brought by an insurance company which had paid the
loss against a reinsurer for indemnity, the decision was in favor of the
former.

92
But in the O'Neill case, the buyer was claiming rights and lost.

On the other hand, in Anderson v. Morice and Rochester & Oleopolis
Oil Co. v. Hughey, the buyer was resisting the seller's action for the price of
goods destroyed. In the Schriver case, the buyer, who had dishonored a
draft for the price, was suing the carrier who had followed the directions of
the unpaid seller. The buyer lost. The buyer in Ogg v. Schuter had also
dishonored a draft and. was suing the unpaid seller. He lost. Whether or
not principle and rule has been honored, justice has been done in most cases.
A Canadian judge said many years ago:
"It is impossible to examine the decisions on this subject [of the
passing of title generally] without being struck by the ingenuity with
which sellers have contended that the property in goods contracted for
had, or had not, become vested in the buyers, according as it suited their
interest; 'and buyers, or their representatives, have, with equal ingenuity,
endeavored to show that they had, or had not, acquired the property in
that for which they contracted; and Judges have not unnaturally appeared anxious to find reasons for giving a judgment which seemed to
them most consistent with natural justice. Under such circumstances,
it cannot occasion much surprise if some of the numerous reported
decisions have been made to depend upon very nice and subtle distinctions, and if some of them should not appear altogether reconcilable with
each other. Nevertheless, we think that in all of them certain rules and
principles have been recognized. . . ." 9
Conclusion
The governing principle, as previously indicated, is that the property in
goods which are the subject of a bargain and sale agreement is transferred
to the buyer at the time when the parties intend it shall be. As an aid in
discovering the intention when none is expressed certain rules have been
developed which all stem from the natural presumption that the buyer would
ordinarily not desire to become owner of the goods he has bargained for until
the seller has fulfilled his duties under the contract. But if the seller is to
render a series of separate performances, it may reasonably be inferred that
when a completed unit of performance is tendered the buyer will be willing
92. However, the railroad had not assumed its duties as carrier as to one lot at least, and
there was no claim of negligence. The buyer had paid the seller of the other lot, but could
probably recover back from him what he had paid on the ground of failure of consideration.
In Hays v. Pittsburg G. & B. Packet Co., 33 Fed. 552 (W. D. Pa. 1888), the buyer
who was claiming rights also lost. The facts are too meager to warrant a suggestion as to
where natural justice lay.
93. Cresswell, J., in Gilmour v. Supple, ii Moore 551, 566 (Upper Canada, Ct. of Err.
and App. 1858).
Lord Blackburn says: "The application of this principle [that there must be a mutual
assent to give and accept the ownership in a specific lot of goods] leads to nice and subtile
distinctions, which perhaps cannot be helped, but are not the less to be lamented." BLACKBURN, CONTRACT OF SALE (3d ed. 19io) 137.
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to accept the ownership of the goods supplied in that lot. Especially is this
so if the buyer accepts delivery of a completed unit of the goods ordered or
such a unit is delivered into the hands of his bailee in accordance with his
instructions. The fact, however, that the buyer is co6perating with the
seller who is engaged in making a delivery, should not be given an importance
it does not deserve. The presence of the buyer or his agents suggests no
reason for entertaining a presumption that he is demanding anything other
than a completed job.
These are the rules and principles which are applied in the cases in which
receptacles furnished by the buyer are not involved. They should likewise
be applied to the cases in which they are involved. The fact that the buyer
supplied the receptacles presents no reason whatever for supposing that he
demands any less or any more from the seller in the way of performance than
when the seller furnishes the receptacles. If the facts in the case will throw
light upon the intention of the parties or warrant reasonable inferences as to
their intention, they should be given due significance; if the facts are ambiguous, the general rules and principles should be applied; but the fact that the
buyer furnished the receptacles should always be regarded as a wholly neutral
circumstance, whether the receptacle be a bottle, a barrel, a sack, a ship or a
tank car.

